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Abstract: A novel criterion for quantifying the resilience of power systems supplying data centres is formulated to measure the
system's ability to sustain functionality even during an outage. By comparative analysis of two alternative data centre power
systems covering apparatus of electrical power supply and environmental control, it is shown that reliability and availability alone
are insufficient as metrics to gauge different designs. The gap is bridged by the proposed resilience analysis to further evaluate
situations of single and double outages. As a complement to the indicators of single point of failure and double point of failure,
respectively, N − 1 and N − 2 security criteria, the novel metrics of a single point of reduced availability and double point of
reduced availability are proposed. These criteria identify those single subsystems or subsystem pairs causing system availability
to drop below requested levels in periods when they are out of service. The metrics so offer information on the overall system's
availability during times of maintenance and failures. Thanks to this understanding, it is shown that a guided reduction of the
number of subsystems considering their relative importance can lead to designs offering desirable trade-offs in terms of
complexity, reliability, availability, and resilience.
 Nomenclature
A availability
Ai inherent availability
Ai0 Ai of electrical utility supply, single circuit
Ao operational availability
Ao0 Ao of electrical utility supply, single circuit
ai,…, zi Boolean variables with index i
Di disjoint success path i
DHY number of downtime hours per year
DPoFm set of {xmi, xmj} leading to double point of failure
(DPoF) of the mth data centre power supply (DCPS)
DPoRAm set of {xmi, xmj} leading to double point of reduced
availability (DPoRA) of the mth DCPS
DS x disjoint sum of system success paths of x
Fk number of possible failure states under the condition of
k simultaneous failure events
Ki conjunctive term of success path i
MDT total maintenance downtime for a given time period
MTBF mean time between failures, reciprocal of λ
MTBM mean time between maintenance
MTTR mean time to repair or replace a failed component
MVI multi variable inversion
M number of required components or subsystems
N total number of components, systems, subsystems
R reliability over a time span of t = 8760 h
R0 R of electrical utility supply, single circuit
SPoFm set of xmi leading to a single point of failure (SPoF) of
the mth DCPS
SPoRAm set of xmi leading to a single point of reduced
availability (SPoRA) of the mth DCPS
SSPxi set of system success paths containing xi
SVI single variable inversion
S x sum of system success paths of x
t time span of 1 a = 365 × 24 h = 8760 h
Xm set of xmi of the mth DCPS
X number of elements of X, cardinality
x¯i negation of Boolean variable xi
xm vector of xmi of the mth DCPS
xmi Boolean variable giving the status of the ith subsystemof the mth DCPS
λ average failure rate per year, reciprocal of MTBF
∩ conjunction, logical AND
∪ disjunction, logical OR
1 Introduction
Data centre power systems (DCPS) are expected to provide
uninterrupted electrical power and continuous environmental
control of the critical load points at high levels of availability. With
the challenge to minimise the life cycle cost of a data centre, the
question of how to design or redesign efficient DCPS with proven
reliability, availability, and fault tolerance arises. A valuable source
for numerical reliability and availability calculation as well as for
component reliability and availability data is IEEE Std 493-2007
[1]. Especially in the field of data centres, the Uptime Institute
categorises infrastructure designs into four tier classes with specific
availability and failure tolerance attributes [2]. While these
quantities were determined empirically, the calculation of DCPS
reliabilities was considered in [3].
Regarding general electric power distribution networks, the
calculation of reliability and availability is an important part of
distribution system engineering [4]. Recent advances in this field
offer clear evidence of the continued interest [5–8]. With a
particular focus on the electrical power distribution of data centres,
methods to analyse the reliability and availability and their relation
to optimisation are given in [9–11]. The modelling scope given in
the present work is extended to also include the environmental
control and affiliated reliability considerations at component and
systemic levels. The resulting comprehensive model of the DCPS
includes the interdependencies of the electrical power distribution
and environmental control. This will allow for calculating the
metrics of reliability and availability of the DCPS covering both its
electrical power distribution and environmental control system.
Beyond reliability and availability, there has been an emergent
need to deal with the issue of resilience. According to [12], in the
case of an outage event, a well-designed resilient system is to
maintain maximum practicable functionality or enable rapid
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restoration with minimum downtime. Further recent suggestions
made for electric power distribution focus on measuring resilience
in response to unfavourable events affecting the network [13, 14].
In the present work focusing on the DCPS, the need for resilience
is recognised, too. The focus laid in this study is on the continued
practical operation even under outages.
If a power system is single-failure tolerant, then it is said to be
N − 1 secure. In the case of double-failure tolerance, it is N − 2
secure. However, resilience analysis is to look beyond those basic
indicators of fault tolerance. For practical operation over a period
of outage, the availability needs to reach certain levels, too.
Outages could be unforeseen or scheduled, e.g. for maintenance
purposes. Is the availability still at the desired level when a
subsystem is out of service? Is the availability still meeting
expectations in the case of double failures? The ability to answer
these questions will give valuable information on the capability of
the system to sustain practical functionality in the event of an
outage.
By comparing the proposed resilience criteria of different DCPS
designs, significant differences in performance are observed. In
Section 2, selected fundamentals are reviewed. Mathematical
definitions of the metrics of a single point of failure (SPoF) and
double point of failure (DPoF) are proposed in Section 3. The
value of reliability and availability for the DCPS design is
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the metrics of
resilience for DCPS. The application of the metrics is elaborated
upon in Section 6. This section also summarises the results of the
analysis of availability, reliability, fault tolerance, and resilience of
the DCPS models discussed in this work. Conclusions are drawn in
Section 7.
2 State-of-the-art and background
IEEE Std 493-2007 [1] including Annex Q is used as a source for
all reliability and availability data of this work. This standard
defines reliability as a function of time with a timespan t of 1, a = 
8760 h
R = e−λt, (1)
λ = 1/MTBF . (2)
As also defined in [1], two different availability metrics are
applicable. These are the inherent availability Ai and operational
availability Ao
Ai = MTBF / MTBF +MTTR , (3)
Ao = MTBM / MTBM +MDT . (4)
While Ai only considers the downtime for repairs of failures, Ao
includes all downtime, including the time needed for scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance as well as logistics.
A number of different methods support the systemic analysis of
reliability. They can be categorised into inductive and deductive
methods. Failure mode and effects analysis [15] is a popular
representative of the family of inductive methods, where the
contribution of subsystem faults to overall system failures is
studied. In the family of deductive methods, however, an overall
system failure is the starting point for identifying the contributors
to this failure. Fault tree analysis (FTA) [16] is a deductive method.
It examines the failure conditions of the overall model to identify
the subsystem as a cause of the failure.
While the FTA employs a negative logic because it is oriented
towards failures, the reliability block diagram (RBD) [17] is its
counterpart of positive logic aimed at dealing with success. In the
present study, all representations are made based on the RBD.
Thanks to this approach, the physical structure of the entire DCPS
is closely mirrored. The RBD covers the electrical power supply
and distribution as well as the environmental control system. The
obtained diagrams depict the given interdependencies of various
success paths and so offer valuable guidance in the process of
analysis and design.
For reliability and availability calculations, the RBD lends itself
to the formulation of expressions of Boolean algebra. For the use
of Boolean algebra, the calculations reviewed hereafter are
fundamental [1, 4, 17]. Accordingly, the system success of two
series-connected elements is only given if both x1 and x2 are true.
The operation is known as logical conjunction
Sser x1, x2 = x1 ∩ x2 . (5)
Alternatively, it may be written as product x1x2. The system success
of two parallel-connected elements is given if x1 or x2 or both are
true. The operation is known as logical disjunction
Spar x1, x2 = x1 ∪ x2 . (6)
In the context of Boolean algebra, it is also common to use the
term sum.
System success is expressed through system success paths
(SSPs). For system success, at least one SSP must be true. As
shown for the following example, three possible SSPs are included
as the sum of Boolean product terms
Sex x = x1 x2 ∪ x3 x4 x6 ∪ x5 . (7)
The SSPs are not mutually exclusive because multiple events may
happen together in one or more SSPs. In order to address this issue,
methods of single variable inversion (SVI) [18] and multi variable
inversion (MVI) [19] were introduced. Applying the MVI algorithm
by Heidtmann [19] to example (7) produces the sum of disjoint
product terms
DSex x = x1 x2 ∪ x1 x2 x3 x4 x6 ∪ x1 x2 x3 x4 x6 x5 . (8)
The sum of product terms (7) and the sum of disjoint product terms
(8) are equivalent. This can be proven by a truth table. Optimising
SVI and MVI algorithms to reduce the number of resulting disjoint
product terms, for instance by preprocessing the input terms, is
discussed in [20–22]. Usually, the MVI results in a lower number of
terms than the SVI. With the representation through disjoint
product terms, all Boolean variables can be replaced by subsystem
reliability respectively availability values, under the condition of
systemic independence at any time. Further limitations are
discussed in [17]. For the example using (8)
Rex xex = Rx1Rx2 + 1 − Rx1Rx2 Rx3Rx4Rx6
+ 1 − Rx1Rx2 1 − Rx3Rx4Rx6 Rx5 .
(9)
Aex = Ax1Ax2 + 1 − Ax1Ax2 Ax3Ax4Ax6
+ 1 − Ax1Ax2 1 − Ax3Ax4Ax6 Ax5 .
(10)
Importance analysis to identify the influence of particular
subsystems on the total system was introduced in [23]. The so-
called H-importance was introduced in [24]. The subsystem xi is
called more H-important if it is included in a higher number of
SSPs compared to xj
SSPxi > SSPx j . (11)
Applying the H-importance concept, the comments and corrections
of [25] have to be considered.
Helpful is also the notation of the number F of possible failure
states of a system with N subsystems. Under the condition of k
simultaneous failure events, the number of failures is equal to [17]
Fk =
N
k
. (12)
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3 Mathematical definition of SPoF and DPoF
A subsystem xmi is a SPoF of the mth DCPS if its failure leads to
overall system failure. For the purpose of analysis, a mathematical
formulation of SPoF is helpful. The following definition of SPoFm
as a subset of the set Xm of all subsystems of the mth DCPS is
proposed. As such, SPoFm encompasses all those subsystems xmi
whose single failure xmi = 0 causes overall system failure, i.e.
results in Sm xm = 0
SPoFm = xmi ∈ Xm x¯mi∏l = 1, l ≠ iN xml = 1
Sm xm = 0 ∩ . (13)
Similarly, the two elements {xmi, xmj} belong to the set DPoFm if
the two affiliated subsystems mark a DPoF. Thus, if
xmi = 0 ∩ (xmj = 0) while all other subsystems are working, then
Sm xm = 0 and the two failed components mark a DPoF
DPoFm = {xmi, xmj} ⊂ Xm x¯mix¯mj∏l = 1, l ≠ i, jN xml = 1
Sm xm = 0 ∩ . (14)
Note that design according to Tier IV [2] or of an availability class
4 [26] does not accept any SPoF, but concerning DPoFs no
statement is made.
4 Value of reliability and availability in the design
of DCPS
To illustrate the level of information offered by the definitions of
reliability (1) and availability (3), (4), two different designs are
considered [3]. Model 1 represents a comprehensive design, while
model 2 is a lean design. Both are to be compared in terms of R, Ai
and Ao. Model 1 is depicted in Fig. 1, with further subsystem
information offered in Appendix. This block diagram shows a
symmetric DCPS design, sized to about 500 kW electrical power
for the load points. It consists of redundant medium voltage utility
supply and distribution ai, redundant generators gi, redundant main
switchgears mi, redundant uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) vi,
and redundant environmental control systems qi, ri, and si. The
usage of multiple transfer switches denoted by ei, ki, oi, ui, yi
enhances the number of redundant supply paths. 
The Boolean status indicators ai, bi,…, zi shown in Fig. 1 stand
for subsystems that consist of one or multiple components. This
can be seen by comparing Fig. 1 with the design detail of model 1
shown in Fig. 2. For example, subsystems ai consist of utility
supply, cable, and switchgear. The grouping of the components
with the corresponding item numbers and the resulting reliabilities
and availabilities for the subsystem is summarised in the Appendix.
The Appendix also gives the reliabilities and availabilities of the
environmental control system, which includes redundant chiller
units, chilled water (CW) piping and control, and redundant
Fig. 1  Model 1 Tier IV DCPS design including all relevant subsystems
 
Fig. 2  Model 1 Tier IV DCPS design detail with subsystems and
components
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computer room air conditioning (CRAC) units of Fig. 1. All item
numbers and dimensions are consistent with IEEE Std 493-2007
[1], Annex Q. Additional calculation details of the applied
component and subsystem data are shown in the Appendix.
With the structural properties described above, model 1 of
Fig. 1 may be seen as a representative example for an elaborate
DCPS design. Model 1 was redrawn in Fig. 3 for a more intuitive
application of Boolean algebra. 
Applying Boolean algebra, the system success of model 1 is
determined as a sum of all product terms Ki denoting SSPs. The
bold lines of Fig. 3 illustrate the first SSP called K1. It can be seen
that K1 relies not only on the electrical power subsystems but also
on the environmental control subsystems q1, r1, s1, which are
connected by heat flow links marked by dashed lines. Model 1
contains 56 subsystems, also summarised in Table 9 of the
Appendix. In total, model 1 contains 320 SSPs
SModel 1 x = K1 ∪ K2 ∪… ∪ K320
= a1b1c1d1e1m1n1o1p1q1r1s1t1u1v1w1x1y1z1 ∪… ∪
a2b2c2d4e2m2n4o2p2q2r2s2d3e1m1t2u2v2w2x4y2z2 .
(15)
As opposed to model 1, alternative model 2, introduced in Fig. 4,
consists of only 32 subsystems. Model 2 applies no transfer
switches, but it is also free of SPoFs. In model 2, the UPS
subsystems vi were replaced by vi′. Owing to not using the transfer
switches ui, the UPS subsystems vi′ are now directly connected for
supply from t1. This difference is also visible from the definitions
of vi and vi′ in Fig. 2 and 3. 
The success of model 2 depends on 12 SSPs:
SModel 2 x = K1 ∪ K2 ∪… ∪ K12
= a1b1c1d1m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1 ∪
g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1 ∪
g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2 ∪
a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2 ∪
a1b1c1d1m1n1p1q1r1s1g2h2i2m2t2v′2z2 ∪
g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1g2h2i2m2t2v′2z2 ∪
a1b1c1d1m1n1p1q1r1s1a2b2c2d2m2t2v′2z2 ∪
g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1a2b2c2d2m2t2v′2z2 ∪
g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2a1b1c1d1m1t1v′1z1 ∪
a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2a1b1c1d1m1t1v′1z1 ∪
g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2g1h1i1m1t1v′1z1 ∪
a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2g1h1i1m1t1v′1z1 .
(16)
By applying the MVI algorithm of [19] to (16), 14 disjoint product
terms of model 2 are obtained in MVI form. Term K1 becomes D1,
term K4 becomes D4, 1 ∨ D4, 2 (see (17)) The sum of disjoint product
terms of model 2 can now be used to calculate the reliability and
availability of the DCPS. With the inherent availability Ai of (3)
and the operational availability Ao of (4) from [1], two different
availability metrics are applicable. The standard [1] explains at
8.6.3: ‘Ao would be the ‘real world’ − how the system really
operates’. The ‘resulting end-user availability based on site-caused
downtime’ of [2] may be seen as an equivalent to the operational
availability Ao. For a Tier IV design, this requires by definition for
the entire DCPS
Ao Tier IV ≥ 0.9999. (18)
Thus, in this case there is a requested availability Ao req of
Ao req = 0.9999. The reliability and availability data of Table 9 of
the Appendix were applied to model 1 and model 2. The reliability
and availability calculation results of models 1 and 2 are listed in
Table 1. Both models are proven to meet the availability
requirements (18) of a Tier IV design. 
In a direct comparison of model 1 and model 2, the less
complex model 2 offers a marginal higher inherent availability
because of the significantly lower number of subsystems. Model 1,
in turn, offers better reliability and operational availability. The
results demonstrate that reliability and availability calculations
alone do not offer sufficient criteria to thoroughly compare DCPS
designs. This observation supports the need for more expressive
metrics.
Fig. 3  Model 1 DCPS design Boolean circuit
 
Fig. 4  Model 2 DCPS design Boolean circuit
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5 Development of resilience analysis metrics
An essential feature of resilience evaluation is the characterisation
of the ability of a system to support practical operation under
various combinations of outages and to continue operation under
outages for a minimum average duration. To reflect these
characteristics, a set of resilience metrics is proposed to cover
availability during outages.
The metrics of SPoF and DPoF discussed in Section 3 are
suitable for identifying whether a DCPS can in principle continue
to operate under contingencies and so support fault tolerance. The
success function is used in the formulation of SPoF in (13) and of
DPoF in (14) for quantitative analysis of the system success. The
metrics SPoFm  and DPoFm  then give the number of SPoFs,
respectively, DPoFs of the mth DCPS design. Lower values point
to a better level of fault tolerance.
In the power system literature, SPoF and DPoF are affiliated
with the issues of N − 1 and N − 2 security. These indicators do
not quantify the potentially detrimental effects on system
availability when one or two subsystems are out of service for
maintenance or due to other causes. However, what is the impact
on system availability when subsystem xi fails? Which pairs of
subsystems {xi, xj} can be taken out of service while keeping up
data centre availability at a high level? Are the availability targets
still met if switchgear m1 and chiller q1 are out for simultaneous
maintenance? Such questions on maintaining practicable
functionality under outages relate to the resilience issue in
accordance with [12].
In analogy to SPoF and DPoF, it is proposed to define the
metrics single point of reduced availability (SPoRA) and double
point of reduced availability (DPoRA) in order to offer answers.
The definition of SPoRAm as a subset of the set Xm of all
subsystems of the mth DCPS is formulated as follows: SPoRAm
encompasses all those subsystems xmi whose single failure xmi = 0
results in Ao Sm xm < Ao Tier IV min
SPoRAm = xmi ∈ Xm x¯mi∏l = 1, l ≠ iN xml = 1
Ao(Sm xm ) < Ao Tier IV min ∩ . (19)
Likewise, the two subsystems {xmi, xmj} belong to the set DPoRAm
if the double failure xmi = 0 ∩ (xmj = 0) results in
A∩ Sm xm < Ao Tier IV min while all other subsystems are working:
DPoRAm = {xmi, xmj} ⊂ Xm x¯mix¯mj∏l = 1, l ≠ i, jN xml = 1
Ao Sm xm < Ao Tier IV min ∩ . (20)
The metrics SPoRAm  and DPoRAm  give the number of elements
of the sets SPoRAm and DPoRAm, respectively. Lower values point
to better availability during single and double failures. Better
availability, in turn, implies a higher mean time of continued
operation.
Table 2 compares the results of the proposed resilience analysis
for model 1 and model 2. Both models are free of SPoFs, as shown
in the second column of this table. As shown in the third column,
model 1 has only 23 DPoFs because of more inherent
redundancies. Model 2 has 31 DPoFs and therefore eight more
compared with model 1.
The numbers of SPoRA and DPoRA are shown in the fourth and
fifth column of Table 2. As opposed to the comparison above,
model 2 has 14 SPoRAs and 448 DPoRAs while model 1 has 18
SPoRAs and 856 DPoRAs. The results confirm that more inherent
redundancies, offered by a higher number of subsystems, do not
necessarily result in a better resilience measured by availability
during outages.
As shown in the comparison of model 1 and model 2, resilience
analysis makes it possible to value different DCPS designs on
additional criteria. The introduced metrics open the capability of
improving DCPS designs with respect to availability, reliability,
and resilience.
6 Application of resilience metrics to design
According to (11), the H-importance of a particular subsystem xi is
given by the total number of SSPs in which it appears, here referred
to SSPxi . With knowledge of the Boolean circuit, SSPxi  can be
determined by counting. A subsystem with a higher SSPxi  is called
more H-important than a subsystem with a lower count. Table 3
shows this analysis for model 1. 
DSModel 2 x = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3, 1 ∪ D3, 2 ∪ D4, 1 ∪ D4, 2 ∪ D5
∪ D6 ∪ D7 ∪ D8 ∪ D9 ∪ D10 ∪ D11 ∪ D12
= b1c1d1m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1 ∪ g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1 a1b1c1d1
∪ g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2 m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1
∪ g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1a1b1c1d1 g1h1i1
∪ a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2m1n1p1q1r1s1t1v′1z1 g2h2i2
∪ a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2t2v′2z2 a1b1c1d1 g1h1i1 g2h2i2
∪ a1b1c1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1g2h2i2m2t2v′2z2 t1v′1z1 n2p2q2r2s2
∪ g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1g2h2i2m2t2v′2z2 t1v′1z1 n2p2q2r2s2a1b1c1d1
∪ a1b1c1d1m1n1p1q1r1s1a2b2c2d2m2t2v′2z2t1v′1z1n2p2q2r2s2 g2h2i2
∪ g1h1i1m1n1p1q1r1s1a2b2c2d2m2t2v′2z2 t1v′1z1n2p2q2r2s2g2h2i2a1b1c1d1
∪ g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2a1b1c1d1m1t1v′1z1 n1p1q1r1s1t2v′2z2
∪ a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2a1b1c1d1m1t1v′1z1n1p1q1r1s1t2v′2z2 g2h2i2
∪ g2h2i2m2n2p2q2r2s2g1h1i1m1t1v′1z1n1p1q1r1s1 t2v′2z2a1b1c1d1
∪ a2b2c2d2m2n2p2q2r2s2g1h1i1m1t1v′1z1n1p1q1r1s1t2v′2z2 a1b1c1d1g2h2i2 .
(17)
Table 1 Reliability and availability analysis results of
models 1 and 2
Model N R Ai Ao
1 56 0.944060844 0.999999871 0.999951180
2 32 0.922792721 0.999999875 0.999948819
 
Table 2 Fault tolerance analysis results of models 1 and 2
Model SPoFm of Fk = 1 DPoFm of Fk = 2 SPoRAm DPoRAm
1 0 of 56 23 of 1540 18 856
2 0 of 32 31 of 496 14 448
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Structural model simplification may be achieved through the
elimination of subsystems with a small SSPxi . Consequently, all
SSPs containing these subsystems are also eliminated. Based on the
H-importance analysis in Table 3, one transformer feed d and one
generator feed i are eliminated. As model 1 is symmetry, either d2
and i2 or d1 and i1 may be selected. Consequently, the transfer
switches e2 and k2 or e1 and k1 are not required either. The result
of the H-importance analysis of this first modification of model 1 is
shown in the two leftmost columns of Table 4. 
In the second modification, the feeds n3 and t3 are eliminated
by example as they are only present in 40 SSPs. Consequently, the
transfer switches o1 and u1 are also not required. The two
rightmost columns of Table 4 show the H-importance analysis
following this second modification.
The third modification of model 1 eliminates feed x2 that is only
present in 16 SSPs. Consequently, the transfer switch y2 is not
required either. The two leftmost columns of Table 5 show the H-
importance analysis following that modification. It resulted in the
DCPS shown in Fig. 5, now labelled as model 3. In model 3, v1 is
replaced by v1′ because the feed of the uninterrupted power supply
(UPS) v1′ is already realised by t1. Details of the component level
of the UPS configurations v1 and v1′ are shown in Table 9 of the
Appendix. 
In the fourth modification, subsystems v1′, w1, and x1 are
eliminated, as seen by comparison of the entries of the first row of
Table 5. Further elimination of t1 is not allowed because u2 would
become a SPoF in that case. As a consequence of the elimination
of UPS v1′, an additional modification is required to meet the non-
SPoF demand regarding short voltage interrupts. The non-
redundant UPS v2 is replaced by a redundant UPS subsystem v1of2,
also listed in Table 9 of the Appendix. Note that M-of-N redundant
subsystems, as for instance v1of2, are considered to be ‘ N −M -
failure tolerant’ within the single and double failure simulations.
The resulting DCPS model of this fourth modification is shown in
Fig. 6, labelled model 4. With model 4, the guided reduction ends
here because the examples are sufficient to show the value of
resilience analysis in the design of DCPS. 
In Table 6, the results of the reliability and availability analysis
of Models 1 to 4 are compared. In summary of all models analysed
here, model 4 is rated as the design with the highest reliability,
inherent availability, and operational availability.
Table 7 shows the results of the fault tolerance and resilience
analysis of Models 1–4 following the application of the resilience
metrics of availability during outages. According to the second
Table 3 H-importance analysis of model 1
SSPxi Subsystems of Model 1
72 d1, d2, d3, d4, i1, i2, i3, i4
80 n1, n2, n3, n4, t1, t2, t3, t4, x1, x2, x3, x4
128 a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, g1, g2, h1, h2
144 e1, e2, k1, k2
160 o1, o2, p1, p2, q1, q2, r1, r2, s1, s2, u1, u2, v1, v2,w1,w2, y1, y2, z1, z2
288 m1,m2
 
Table 4 H-importance analysis of first and second modification of model 1
SSPxi Subsystems after first modification SSPxi Subsystems after second modification
40 a1, b1, c1, d1, d3, g1, h1, i1, i3, n3, n4, t3, t4 16 x1, x2
44 x1, x2, x3, x4 24 a1, b1, c1, d1, d3, g1, h1, i1, i3
48 n1, n2, t1, t2 32 n1, n2, p1, q1, r1, s1, t1, t2, v1,w1
72 d4, i4 34 d4, i4, x3, x4
80 e1, k1 36 n4, t4
88 o1, o2, p1, p2, q1, q2, r1, r2, s1, s2, u1, u2, v1, v2,w1,w2, y1, y2, z1, z2 48 e1, k1
96 a2, b2, c2, g2, h2 50 a2, b2, c2, g2, h2, y1, y2, z1, z2
144 m2 68 m2, o2, p2, q2, r2, s2, u2, v2,w2
160 m1 96 m1
 
Table 5 H-importance analysis of third and fourth modification of model 1
SSPxi Subsystems of model 3 SSPxi Subsystems of model 4
16 t1, v1′,w1, x1 16 t1
20 a1, b1, c1, d1, d3, g1, h1, i1, i3 20 a1, b1, c1, d1, d3, g1, h1, i1, i3
28 n1, n2, n4, p1, q1, r1, s1 28 n1, n2, n4, p1, q1, r1, s1
30 d4, i4 30 d4, i4
32 t2 32 t2
34 x3, x4, z2 34 x3, x4, z2
36 t4 36 t4
40 e1, k1 40 e1, k1
43 a2, b2, c2, g2, h2 43 a2, b2, c2, g2, h2
50 y1, z1 50 y1, z1
56 o2, p2, q2, r2, s2 56 o2, p2, q2, r2, s2
60 m2 60 m2
68 u2, v2,w2 68 u2, v1o f 2,w2
80 m1 80 m1
 
6 J. Eng.
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
column of this table, all analysed models here are free of SPoFs.
Referring to the third column of this table, model 1 has the lowest
DPoF number, which is 23. Model 4 is second best with 27
DPoFs. Model 2 follows in the third position with 31 DPoFs.
The fourth column of Table 7 shows model 2 as the design with
the lowest SPoRA number, which is 14. Model 4 follows with 17
SPoRAs. Comparing the DPoRA number in the last column of this
table, a similar order can be seen. Model 2 has the lowest number
of 448 DPoRAs, and model 4 follows with 597 DPoRAs.
To better value the results of Tables 6 and 7, Tables 8 shows a
ranking of the integrated analysis of availability, reliability, fault
tolerance, and resilience. The results of the inherent availabilities
are not ranked because the values are equal up to the 6th decimal
place. Rank 1 means the best result. The arithmetic average gives
the sum of ranks divided by the number of ranked metrics, which is
five in this table.
Table 8 shows that model 4 with 43 subsystems has the best
reliability and operational availability, and the second-best fault
tolerance and resilience compared with all other models considered
in this work. Second best in terms of rank average are jointly the
comprehensive design of model 1 and the lean design of model 2.
Compared to model 1, model 4 counts 13 fewer subsystems,
making it more life cycle cost-effective.
The analysis of Table 8 shows how the asymmetric DCPS
design of model 4 can offer an appropriate trade-off between
availability, reliability, fault tolerance, and resilience compared
with all other models. This is true even though other models with a
higher number of subsystems can offer higher inherent
redundancies. The results are critically affected by the newly
proposed resilience metrics of SPoRA and DPoRA for
quantification of availability during outages. Without those new
metrics, models 1 and 2 would jointly appear as best ranked.
Thanks to the novel resilience metrics, new insight was obtained.
The discussed model reduction may be seen as an example of the
DCPS design process taking into account resilience metrics.
7 Conclusions
Availability, reliability, fault tolerance, and resilience are key terms
affiliated with the performance of data centres and their supplying
power systems and environmental control. While availability,
reliability, and fault tolerance are widely used in the analysis,
indicators of resilience have been missing. This issue was
addressed in this work. First and foremost, SPoRA and DPoRA
were introduced as novel metrics of resilience. The metrics of
SPoRA gives all those single subsystems that when being out-of-
service cause the overall system availability to drop below the level
targeted for the overall power system. DPoRA is the corresponding
metric for subsystem pairs that cause the overall system availability
to drop below the target level when being out of service. The novel
resilience metrics thus quantify how many single and double
failure events let the mean time of continued operation to fall
below a service level agreement. It is clear that a prolonged
operation even under outages can only be expected when reaching
a desired level of availability. From these metrics, it is also possible
for operators to assess the impact of maintenance schedules on the
desired availability levels.
The research performed for this study shows that the proposed
resilience metrics are not only useful for operators, they also offer a
design aid in the development stage. To substantiate this claim, an
Fig. 5  Model 3 DCPS design Boolean circuit
 
Fig. 6  Model 4 DCPS design Boolean circuit
 
Table 6 Reliability and availability analysis results summary
Model N R Ai Ao
1 56 0.944060844 0.999999871 0.999951180
2 32 0.922792721 0.999999875 0.999948819
3 46 0.936071703 0.999999868 0.999946691
4 43 0.950255588 0.999999999 0.999957825
 
Table 7 Fault tolerance and resilience analysis results
summary
Model SPoFm of Fk = 1 DPoFm of Fk = 2 SPoRAm DPoRAm
1 0 of 56 23 of 1540 18 856
2 0 of 32 31 of 496 14 448
3 0 of 46 40 of 1035 21 767
4 0 of 43 27 of 903 17 597
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original DCPS model with a significant number of redundancies
was reduced using H-importance analysis. Finally, four alternative
designs were obtained; two of the designs were of asymmetric
topology. All designs fulfil the requirement of the Tier IV standard:
they are free of SPoFs and so offer N − 1 security, and they are
comparable up to the fourth digit in terms of operational
availability. When compared with the original model showing the
most inherent redundancies, the reduced asymmetric designs can
offer a compelling performance based on an integrated analysis of
availability, reliability, fault tolerance, and resilience. As these
reduced asymmetric designs have a lower number of subsystems,
they are more cost-effective. Thanks to the resilience metrics,
additional data are available to make informed decisions on
complexity-resilience trade-offs.
In sum, the proposed quantification of resilience was shown to
offer deeper insight into the assessment of power systems for data
centres. It offers guidance in judging trade-offs in the integrated
design of power distribution systems covering both electric power
supply and environmental control of data centres. A further step in
future work could include the transition from a guided reduction of
design complexity as presented here to an optimised design based
on optimisation criteria also involving resilience metrics.
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9 Appendix
 
Source of all item numbers in Table 9 is [1], appendix Q. The
failure rate and downtime per failure of ‘electric utility power
supplies to industrial plants’, ‘single circuit’ is given in Table 3-1
of [1] with λ = 1.956/a; MTTR = 1.32 h; t = 1 a. The downtime
hours per year DHY [1] is defined as follows:
DHY = 1 − Ao 8760 h/a, (21)
DHY = λ MTTR . (22)
If no data for MTBM and MDT are available, Ao may be calculated
by rearranging of (21) and replacing DHY by (22)
Ao = 1 − λ MTTR/ 8760 h/a . (23)
Application of (1), (3), and (23) gives the result of reliability,
inherent availability, and operational availability of the utility
supply single circuit
R0 = e−λt = e−1.956/a ∗ 1 a = 0.141422983, (24)
Ai0 = 1/ 1 + λ MTTR/ 8760 h/a = 0.999705347, (25)
Ao0 = 1 − λ MTTR/ 8760 h/a = 0.999705267. (26)
The results are denoted by the triplet {R0, Ai0, Ao0} in the row for
subsystem ai.
The reliability calculation of a subsystem in the special case of
N identical, parallel components x of which M is required to
guarantee the subsystem success, a so-called M-of-N system, can
be simplified [17]
RM−of −N = ∑
k = 0
N −M N
k
RxN − k 1 − Rx k . (27)
The inherent and operational availability calculation of an M-of-N
system is processed in analogy to (27).
Table 8 Availability, reliability, fault tolerance, and resilience analysis results
Model Rank Rm Aim ≥ 0.999999 Rank Aom SPoFm = 0 Rank DPoFm Rank SPoRAm Rank DPoRAm Rank average
1 2 ✓ 2 ✓ 1 3 4 2.4
2 4 ✓ 3 ✓ 3 1 1 2.4
3 3 ✓ 4 ✓ 4 4 3 3.6
4 1 ✓ 1 ✓ 2 2 2 1.6
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Table 9 Grouping of components into subsystems
Var. Subsystem Item No. [1] (Dimension) M-of-N R Ai Ao
ai utility supply and distribution {R0, Ai0, Ao0}, 46 (500 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 193, 79 1 of 1 0.134138037 0.999681264 0.998994527
bi transformer 79, 46 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 208, 35 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.),
69
1 of 1 0.991153156 0.999997159 0.999879920
ci transformer switchgear 191 1 of 1 0.990554799 0.999992102 0.999455601
di feed from ci to ei 69, 35 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.997390087 0.999999793 0.999954195
ei transfer switch utility supply 183, 20 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 69, 130 1 of 1 0.947721583 0.999991090 0.997928202
gi generator 98, 35 (50 m) 29 (2 pcs.) 185 1 of 1 0.882614902 0.999742254 0.997355304
hi generator switchgear 191 1 of 1 0.990554799 0.999992102 0.999455601
ii feed from hi 69, 35 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.997390087 0.999999793 0.999954195
ki transfer switch generator 183, 20 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 69, 130 1 of 1 0.947721583 0.999991090 0.997928202
mi main switchgear 191 1 of 1 0.990554799 0.999992102 0.999455601
ni feed from mi 69, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.997402675 0.999999829 0.999954239
oi transfer switch environmental
control from ni
183, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 185 1 of 1 0.967717971 0.999994045 0.999748157
pi switchgear environmental control 191 1 of 1 0.990554799 0.999992102 0.999455601
qi chiller units and feed from pi 69, 20 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 56, 129, 195, 177, 228 (4
pcs.), 235, 199, 163, 237, 229, 124, 237, 229, 163,
156, 176, 228 (4 pcs.)
2 of 3 0.924986820 0.999999814 0.999967038
ri chilled water piping, control panel
and feed from pi
67, 20 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 129, 157, 228 (4 pcs.), 2 1 of 1 0.990233812 0.999998035 0.994760281
si computer room air conditioning
units and feed from pi
67, 20 (50 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 155, 175, 228 (4 pcs.), 235,
199, 163, 237, 229, 82, 138, 12, 110, 129
4 of 5 0.957867596 0.999999879 0.999995252
ti feed from mi 69, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.997402675 0.999999829 0.999954239
ui transfer switch, from ti, switchgear
UPS
183, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 185, 191 1 of 1 0.958577680 0.999986147 0.999203895
vi feed from ui, UPS, feed to wi 69, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 131, 10, 168, 9, 238, 203,
20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 69
1 of 1 0.924291516 0.999662672 0.998068330
v′i UPS,model 2: feed to zimodel 3:
feed to w1
131, 10, 168, 9, 238, 203, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 69 1 of 1 0.926698454 0.999662843 0.998114005
v1of2 feed from u2, UPS, Model 4: feed
to w2
69, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 131, 10, 168, 9, 238, 203,
20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 69
1 of 2 0.994268225 0.999999886 0.999996269
wi switchgear output UPS 191 1 of 1 0.990554799 0.999992102 0.999455601
xi feed from wi 69, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.997402675 0.999999829 0.999954239
yi transfer switch to zi 183, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.), 185 1 of 1 0.967717971 0.999994045 0.999748157
zi feed to a data center load point 191, 67, 20 (20 m), 29 (2 pcs.) 1 of 1 0.989606864 0.999991895 0.999253742
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